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CITY OF SHERRILL V. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF
NEW YORK: A REGRETFUL POSTSCRIPT TO

THE TAXATION CHAPTER IN COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LA W

Sarah Krakoff*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a tough time to be teaching American Indian law. As a professor, one tries
to maintain at least some semblance of respect for the various branches of government,
hoping to encourage serious examination of divisive issues of law and policy. Yet, I
know I am not alone in trying desperately to avoid lapsing into unseemly cynicism,
bordering on whiny sarcasm, when it comes to teaching some of the recent United States
Supreme Court decisions in the field. It is not merely the pathetic whine of the sore
loser. It is true that most American Indian law scholars tend to support the long-standing
view that inherent tribal sovereignty is a crucial moral and legal first principle. But most
of us recognize there are some cases that erode tribal self-governance, either by allowing
concurrent state authority or finding an absence of tribal inherent sovereignty, that are
nonetheless decided on defensible and well-articulated grounds. There is also a rich
scholarly debate about the legitimacy and extent of federal power over tribal nations,1
and a range of disagreement over the appropriate responses to recent Supreme Court
decisions. 2 In short, the professoriate is not a monolith in terms of its values about the
field or its views about the law. But as legal academics, we hope for at least some

* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. I am grateful to Janel Falk Chin for her
research assistance.
1. See e.g. William Bradford, "Another Such Victory and We Are Undone ": A Call to an American Indian
Declarationof Independence, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 71 (2004); Robert N. Clinton, There is No FederalSupremacy
Clausefor Indian Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 113 (2002); Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary
Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams' Algebra, 30 Ariz. L.
Rev. 413 (1988); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with EurocentricMyopia: A Reply to Professor
Laurence's Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 Ariz. L.
Rev. 439 (1988).
2. See e.g. L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty After Atkinson and
Hicks, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 669, 674-75 (2003) (arguing the absence of constitutional underpinnings to tribal
inherent sovereignty explains the Supreme Court's reluctance to recognize tribal control over non-members);
Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or Not So Little) ConstitutionalCrisis Developing in Indian Law?: A
Brief Essay, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 271, 284-85 (2003) (proposing congressional restoration of tribal inherent
powers and, ultimately, a constitutional amendment protecting sovereignty); Joseph William Singer, Canons of
Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 641, 657-59 (2003)
(asserting that inherent tribal sovereignty is recognized and affirmed in the United States Constitution).
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consistency with identifiable principles, whether through the professed jurisprudential,
social, or even political commitments of the Justices, or some over-arching commitment
to the particular substantive field of law. We want, at least, something identifiable to
analyze and critique. We certainly are all realists now, and many of us are firmly in the
critical camp, from the theory perspective. But still, to feel forced to conclude that the
only unifying theme running through recent Indian law cases is that the Court either does
not care about, or is hostile to, the interests of American Indians is cause for
despondence. Perhaps it is simply not the time to be commenting on the field.
Unfortunately, the Court's case law affects disputes on the ground in profound ways, and
there is a need to comprehend the decisions at least in terms of their practical effects.
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York3 warrants scrutiny for that reason,
and so although the opinion is one of the most cringe-inducing of late, it is nonetheless
the focus of this essay.
In City of Sherrill, the Court held that the Oneida Indian Nation is barred by the
equitable defenses of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility from asserting its immunity
from state taxation of tribally owned lands within reservation boundaries. 4 The Court's
odd and cowardly avoidance of the substantive legal question has an up-side. City of
Sherrill will be difficult to apply as a precedent in other cases involving tribal claims of
immunity from state and local taxation. Still, City of Sherrill will cause uncertainty on
the ground, and embolden state and local tax authorities to push even further into Indian
country than they have already. 5 It also obscures the historical record, and makes
unwarranted assumptions about the future. City of Sherrill appears in many ways to
revive the underlying assumptions of some federal and state courts at mid-twentieth
century-that tribal sovereignty is a waning concept, a historical relic that has outlived
its usefulness, and has little, if any, legal force. 6 As many commentators have noted, this
assumption is directly at odds with the federal policies of the last three decades, which
7
promote tribal independence and self-determination.
In applying equitable defenses to the Oneida Indian Nation, the Court is embracing
an apologist stand toward the many instances of immoral and illegal governmental
actions against the tribe, and ultimately suggesting that the passage of time renders that
history irrelevant, indeed even unmentionable. Note the despondent tone? In order to
keep the despondency separate from the practical legal analysis, from here on this article
will do its best to compartmentalize. Part II is a detached assessment of how City of

3. 125 S. Ct. 1478 (2005).
4. Id. at 1480.

5. Almost immediately after the City of Sherrill decision, Oneida County filed foreclosure actions on
fifty-nine parcels of land within the Oneida Indian Nation. Jim Adams, New York Tax Foreclosures Revive
Painful Memories, http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096411557 (Sept. 12, 2005). Several other
local governments and taxing authorities have similarly asserted claims, resulting in a flurry of additional
litigation. Id.
6. See Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a Modern
ConstitutionalDemocracy 27 (Yale U. Press 1987).
7. See e.g. Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of
Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 Yale L.J. 1 (1999); David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law:
The Rehnquist Court's Pursuitof States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 Minn. L.
Rev. 267 (2001); Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal
Sovereignty, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 1177 (2001).
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Sherrill fits into the body of federal Indian law regarding taxation of tribal property. Part
II is an unbuttoned editorial, replete with the occasional cynical and whiny flair, on
what is wrong with the decision and the Court.
II.

A POSTSCRIPT TO THE TAXATION CHAPTER OF

COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LA W

Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law8 is the leading treatise in the field. The
recent revision, long awaited after twenty-three years, was in press when the City of
Sherrill decision was published, and there was only a short period of time to add a
cursory footnote or two about the case. What follows in this article is a longer
description of how City of Sherrill fits into the body of federal law concerning state
taxation of Indian nations.
The Taxation chapter declares "[t]he limitations on state power to tax in Indian9
country apply with full force when the tax is imposed on tribes or tribal members."
Local government taxes, such as the property taxes asserted by Sherrill against the
Oneida Indian Nation, are treated the same as state taxes. 10 In general, state and local
governments may not tax Indian tribes or individuals for activities, including property
ownership, occurring within Indian country. 11 This categorical prohibition on state
taxation may be overcome if Congress has authorized state taxation of tribes or tribal
when Congress has made its
members. However, "[a]uthorization will only be found..,
12
intention to allow state taxes 'unmistakably clear."'
Given this categorical immunity from state taxation within Indian country, the
following questions remain: (1) on whom does the burden of taxation rest, the tribe or
tribal member, or a non-Indian?; 13 (2) does the activity being taxed take place in Indian
14
country, or is the property being taxed located within Indian country?; and (3) has
country? 15
Indian
within
members
Congress authorized state taxation of tribes or tribal
However, in City of Sherrill, the Supreme Court does not ground its decision in any of
these three avenues of inquiry. Instead, it applies the equitable doctrines of "laches,
acquiescence, and impossibility"']6 to deny the Oneida Indian Nation's claim of tax
17
immunity.
The parties in City of Sherrill assumed the third question, whether Congress had
authorized state taxation of the Oneida Indian Nation, would control the outcome of the
case. i s The Second Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Oneida Indian Nation's
8. Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005 ed., LexisNexis 2005).

9. Id. at § 8.03[l][b], 692.
10. See id at § 8.03[I][b].
11. See id. (listing tribal and tribal member immunity from a variety of state and local taxes, including

excise taxes on motor fuels, motor vehicle excise taxes, net income taxes, personal property taxes, real property
taxes, cigarette excise taxes, vendor license fees, and hunting and fishing licenses).
12. Id. at § 8.03[1][c], 696 (quoting Mont. v. Blackfeet Tribe ofIndians, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985)).
13. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra n. 8, at §§ 8.03[1][b], 8.03[1][d].
14. Id. at § 8.03[1][b].

15. Id. at§ 8.03[1][c].
16. City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1494.

17. Id.
18. Seeid. at 1483.
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tax immunity on the grounds that clear congressional authorization was lacking, 19 and
thus, the parties briefed the issue extensively before the Supreme Court.
The form this
question would have taken, had the Court considered it, would have been whether
Congress diminished or disestablished the Oneida Indian Nation's reservation when it
21
ratified a treaty that encouraged tribal members to remove to Kansas.
The Oneida Indian Nation's argument rested on the fact that the lands Sherrill was
attempting to tax, which the tribe had acquired on the open market as part of a process of
restoring their aboriginal land base, were within the historic Oneida Indian
Reservation. 22 The lands had been set aside for the tribe under the Treaty of Fort
Schuyler,2 3 entered into with New York in 1788, and confirmed in the Treaty of
Canandaigua with the Six (Iroquois) Nations in 1794. 24 The federal policy of removing
Indian nations from their coveted parcels on the east coast to the mid-west territories
resulted in a new treaty with the Oneidas in 1838, the Treaty with the New York Indians
("Treaty of Buffalo Creek"). 25 The Treaty of Buffalo Creek was intended, in part, to
encourage any Oneidas remaining on their reservation lands to remove to lands reserved
for them in Kansas. 26 But, as the Supreme Court in City of Sherrill explained, a
condition of the Treaty's ratification required a federal commissioner to "'fully and fairly
explai[n]' the terms to each signatory tribe and band." 2 7 The federal officer who met
with the Oneidas "assured them they would not be forced to move but could remain on
'their lands where they reside,' i.e., they could 'if they ch[ose] to do so remain where
28
they are forever.'
Rather than confront the question of whether the Treaty of Buffalo Creek explicitly
diminished the Oneidas' reservation, the Court stated in a footnote:
[We] need not decide today whether, contrary to the Second Circuit's determination, the
1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek disestablished the Oneidas' Reservation .... The relief
[Oneida Indian Nation] seeks-recognition of present and future sovereign authority to
remove the land from local taxation-is unavailable because of the long lapse of time,
during which New York's governance remained
undisturbed, and the present-day and
29
future disruption such relief would engender.
Notwithstanding the categorical prohibition on state taxation within Indian country, the
City of Sherrill decision upholds a tax imposed within what the Court assumes to be an
in-tact reservation.

19. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139, 161 (2d. Cir. 2003).

20. See Br. of Amicus Curiae for Respts. at 16, City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. 1478 [hereinafter Br. for
Respts.]; Reply Br. at 7, 9, 16-17, City of Sherrill, 125 S.Ct. 1478 [hereinafter Reply Br.].
21. See City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1485, 1490 n. 9 (citing Treaty with the New York Indians (Jan. 15,
1838), 7 Stat. 550 [hereinafter Treaty of Buffalo Creek]).

22. Id. at 1488.
23. Id. at 1495-96 (citing Treaty of FortSchuyler (Sept. 22, 1788) (available in Pet.'s Writ of Cert., City of
Sherrill, 125 S.Ct. 1478)).
24. Id. (citing Treaty of Canandaigua(Nov. 11, 1794), 7 Stat. 44).
25. Id. at 1485 (citing Treaty of Buffalo Creek, supra n. 21).
26. City of Sherrill, 125 S.Ct. at 1485.
27. Id. (quoting N.Y. Indians v. U.S., 170 U.S. 1,21-22 (1898)) (bracket in original).
28. Id. (quoting Jt. App. at 146, City of Sherrill, 125 S.Ct. 1478) (emphasis in original, bracket in original).

29. Id.
at 1490 n. 9 (citation omitted).
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Had the Supreme Court reached the question of diminishment and resolved that
question in favor of Sherrill, the Court's decision would have fallen into a line of cases,
beginning with Goudy v. Meath,3 ° permitting increasingly less explicit congressional
language to result in the abrogation of tribal tax immunity. 31 Goudy, along with County
of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation3 2 and Cass
County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians,33 involved tribal reacquisition of lands
that had been alienated due to allotment policies. 34 Language in Yakima "appeared to
cabin Goudy's broad language concerning the equivalence of alienability with
taxability." 35 But in Cass County, the Court clarified that when Congress explicitly
makes Indian lands freely alienable, state taxation is permissible unless Congress clearly
36
states otherwise.
The Taxation chapter, discussing Goudy, Yakima, and Cass County, ends with the
following: "Together, Goudy, Yakima, and Cass County stand for the proposition that
Congress is presumed to authorize state taxation of real property when it renders lands
This rule only applies when Congress has clearly removed the
freely alienable.
37
restrictions on the land."
The Supreme Court's City of Sherrill decision leaves the current state of the law
In avoiding the
regarding Congressional authorization of state taxation in-tact.
substantive question, the Court resisted Sherrill's argument that reservation
disestablishment or diminishment, and therefore authorization of state taxing authority,
Creek. 3 8
could be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the Treaty of Buffalo
Sherrill argued the history of federal efforts to remove the Oneidas from New York
established that the Treaty's purpose was to "complete the removal of the Oneidas from
[the state].",39 The Oneida Indian Nation and the United States, as amicus, asserted that
the focus of the Treaty was to substitute Kansas lands for those in Wisconsin, which had
been proposed as the removal territory in an earlier treaty. 40 Therefore, the United States
and the Oneidas argued the Oneidas' New York lands were not directly at issue, and no
congressional purpose to disestablish or diminish the New York reservation could be
inferred. 4 1 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court noted, the federal officer who met with
the Oneidas assured them they would not be compelled to move, and could remain where
they currently resided. 42 For the Court to find express congressional authorization to tax
or
diminishment
congressional
finding clear
in these circumstances-by

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

203 U.S. 146 (1906).
See Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law, supra n. 8, at § 8.03[1][c], 698-99.
502 U.S. 251 (1992).
524 U.S. 103 (1998).
See Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra n. 8, at § 8.03[ 1][c], 699-700.
Id. at § 8.03[1][c].
Id.(citing Cass County, 524 U.S. at 114).
Id.at § 8.03[1][c], 700-01.
See Reply Br., supra n. 20, at 9.
Id.
See Br. for Respts., supra n. 20, at 6, 16.
Id.
City of Sherrill, 125 S.Ct. at 1485; see also supra n. 28 and accompanying text.
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have stretched the
disestablishment of the Oneidas' New York reservation-would
43
current doctrines well beyond previous applications.
Thus, City of Sherrill makes no new statements concerning the requirements for
congressional authorization of state taxation. But in dismissing the Oneida Indian
Nation's claims of tax immunity based on the equitable defenses of laches, acquiescence,
and impossibility, the Court nonetheless injects an entirely new kind of uncertainty into
the realm of tribal/state tax relations. Even in the absence of clear congressional
authorization to tax, state and local taxing jurisdictions may hereafter feel emboldened to
tax Indian property within reservation boundaries, depending on the specific factual
history and character of the surrounding lands. For litigants attempting to predict
outcomes, one way to read City of Sherrill is that it covertly lines up with Goudy,
Yakima, and Cass County with regard to the Court's position that Indian real property
purchased on the open market is taxable. The Court could not come to this latter
conclusion directly without departing dramatically from precedents regarding treaty
46
45
44
and congressional authorization to tax,
reservation diminishment,
interpretation,
therefore instead it pressed its case quietly through the discretion available in equitable
doctrines. For other courts considering these questions, the better approach is to treat
City of Sherrill as an anomalous case, so specific in its holding that it will rarely apply to
other circumstances. The weight of federal Indian law counsels against the application
of time-bound defenses to Indian tribes for the good reason that, for long stretches of that
time, federal and state governments actively prevented tribes from attempting to
47
vindicate their rights, even rights solemnly set out in treaties and statutes.

III.

AARRRGHHH!

When drafting a treatise, one must always keep the audience in mind. Practitioners
and judges are constrained to try to make sense of the law. They look to a treatise for
assistance in that regard. In one respect, City of Sherrill is an easy case to fit into a
treatise. The case provides little substance with regard to core doctrinal areas, such as
when Congress has authorized taxation, or when Congress has diminished or
disestablished a reservation, that the descriptions of those areas of law can remain fairly
untouched.
Yet, City of Sherrill simultaneously flings open the doors of equitable discretion.
Relying on City of Sherrill, litigants will ask courts to dismiss tribal claims grounded in
historical wrongs more frequently, and courts will grant those requests for dismissal
more frequently. The substantive law is relatively untouched, but it will rarely be
applied.

43. See Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra n. 8, § 8.03[1][c].
44. See Minn. v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 (1999); Cohen's Handbook of
Federal Indian Law, supra n. 8, at § 2.02.
45. See Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra n. 8, § 3.04[3] (discussing reservation
diminishment).
46. See Blackfeet, 471 U.S. at 761-62; Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law, supra n. 8, at ch. 8.
47. See Wilkinson, supra n. 6, at 32, 37-41,44-46, 53, 58, 69-75.
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There is already evidence of City of Sherrill's huge potential outside of the
48
taxation context. In Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki, the Second Circuit
relied on City of Sherrill in reversing a $248 million dollar damages award to the Cayuga
Indian Nation and other tribes for what the district court found to be clear violations of
the Non-Intercourse Act. 49 The Cayuga Indian Nation court stated that City of Sherrill
50
"dramatically altered the legal landscape against which we consider plaintiffs' claims."
A treatise, in its necessarily compartmentalized and detached description of the law,
cannot convey this sense in which the Court has undermined core legal principles
without having the courage to say it is doing so. Practitioners and judges may well want
to know this too; and therefore, a rant can serve some functions that a treatise cannot.
A rant can also take a much more pointed position with respect to the morality of
the Supreme Court's decision. The City of Sherrill decision, more than any other in
recent times (and that is saying a lot), puts the Court in the role of moral arbiter. The
Court is weighing in on one side of the historical ledger, and to put it bluntly, it is the
wrong side for our times. As discussed below, the Court distorts the history of our
government's suppression of tribalism and uses those distortions as the basis for its
current unilateral perpetuation of that suppression. The Court, which has no American
Indian members and never has; the Court, which is the non-representative branch of
government; the Court, which has ostensibly been relegated to the role of deferring to
Congress in Indian affairs; the Court, which instead is reviewing anything it can get its
hands on in order to weigh in on the side of non-Indians, who have greater potential to
influence the legislative process; the Court, which is therefore perverting the core
doctrines of law that apply to federal-tribal relations. This Court: Indians should just
stay out of it. Unfortunately, Indian nations are often constrained to pursue issues before
the Supreme Court.
In City of Sherrill, the Oneida Indian Nation won in the Second Circuit, and the
City petitioned the Court to hear the case. 5 1 Following the decision in Cayuga Indian
Nation, there will be a strong temptation to pursue Supreme Court review, given the
Second Circuit dismissed not only the Cayuga Indian Nation's claim for eviction, but the
entire suit on the grounds that the damages claims stemmed from an underlying claim of
possession. 52 Therefore, the Cayuga Indian Nation and other tribes are faced with the
following choice: allow the Circuit decision to remain uncontested and abandon their
land claims for now, or take the Supreme Court gamble, risking the poor odds that the
Court will do anything other than affirm, resulting in the end of most tribal land claims
permanently.

48. 413 F.3d266(2dCir. 2005).

49. Id. at 268 (citing Pub. L. No. 1-33, 1.Stat. 137 (1790) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000)) [hereinafter
Non-Intercourse Act]).

50. Id. at 273.
51. 125 S. Ct. at 1478.
52. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 279.
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Laches?!?

It is important to be clear about the issue before the Court in City of Sherrill. The
issues were not whether the Oneida Indian Nation could tax or assert regulatory control
over non-Indians in Sherrill. 5 3 Instead, the issue was solely whether the Oneida Indian
Nation had to pay property taxes to Sherrill on land that the Nation owns in fee simple,
that is within the boundaries of their reservation, and that was alienated from them in
54
violation of federal law.
There are two ways to conceptualize the relevant time frame for the dispute that
resulted in the City of Sherrill decision. The first is to consider the question of Sherrill's
tax authority as the latest instantiation of the long-standing disputes between the Indian
Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy and the State of New York. The second is to
narrow the frame to fit around the specific legal issue: whether Sherrill has the authority
to tax lands reacquired by the Oneida Indian Nation on the open market. In the first time
frame, the dispute begins in 1795, when New York first attempted to purchase lands
from the Oneidas, in violation of the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua 55 and the
Non-Intercourse Act.56 In the second, the dispute begins in 1997 when the Oneida
Indian Nation purchased the first parcel of fee land that would become the subject of this
dispute. 5 7 Under either time frame, applying laches and other equitable defenses to the
Oneida Indian Nation's claim of tax immunity is inappropriate. Had the Oneida Indian
Nation or the United States been given the chance to brief the issue, it is likely they
58
would have made these and other compelling arguments to the Court.
1.

The "Historical Wrongs" Time frame

The Oneida Indian Nation is the successor tribe to the Oneida Nation, one of the
tribes of the great Iroquois Confederacy. 59 Despite early efforts by the United States
Continental Congress to protect the Confederacy's rights to their aboriginal lands, 60 New
61
York asserted itself as the government with which the tribes would have to negotiate.
In 1788, New York and the Oneida Nation entered into the Treaty of Fort Schuyler,

53. See City ofSherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1495 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
54. Id.
55. Id.
at 1484 (citing Treaty of Canandaigua,supran. 24).
56. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 177).
57. Id.
at 1482-83.
58. See City of Sherrill, 125 S.Ct. at 1497 n. 5 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that Sherrill
attempted to add the defense of laches to its answer in the district court, but the district court refused on futility
grounds. Id. The Second Circuit upheld that determination, and Sherrill failed to preserve the issue of laches
in its petition for certiorari or brief on the merits before the Court. Id.The Court thus determined the outcome
of the case on grounds neither raised nor briefed by any of the parties. Id. at 1490 n. 8 ("We resolve this case
on considerations not discretely identified in the parties' briefs."). The majority opinion in City of Sherrillis an
excellent object lesson for why the Court should restrain itself from deciding cases on grounds not actually
raised or briefed by the parties.
59. Id.
at 1483.
60. See Jay Donald Jerde, Learning to Sell Grandmother: Why City of Sherrill, New York v. Oneida Indian
Nation of New York Should be Upheld to Preserve Tax-Free Status of Tribal Real Estate Acquisitions, 28
Hamline L. Rev. 341, 348 (2005).
61. See id; see also Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 418 (1942 ed., Five Rings
Corp. 1986).
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which required the Oneidas to cede "all their lands" 62 to New York in exchange for cash
and in-kind payments. 63 The Treaty also set aside a 300,000 acre tract as the Oneidas'
reservation, and promised the state's protection of the Oneidas' rights therein. 64 The
United States Constitution vested sole authority to engage in commerce with the Indian
Tribes in the United States, 65 and early federal policy reinforced the notion that the
federal government, and not the states, would have sole authority to enter into treaties
with tribes. 66 Thus, despite New York's efforts to be the sole arbiter of the Oneidas'
fate, the federal government "initially pursued a policy protective of the New York
Indians, undertaking to secure the Tribes' rights to reserved lands." 67 In 1790, Congress
passed the first Non-Intercourse Act, prohibiting the sale of tribal lands without federal
approval.6 8 And in 1794, the United States entered into the Treaty of Canandaigua,
affirming the Treaty of Fort Schuyler, and promising to protect the Oneidas' "'free use
70
69
of their reservation.
and enjoyment"'
Despite the United States' assertion of control, New York immediately resumed its
practice of attempting to purchase lands from the Oneidas. In 1795, New York entered
into negotiations to purchase 100,000 acres of the Oneidas' reservation without federal
approval.71 Then, as the City of Sherrill Court dryly noted, "[t]he Federal Government's
policy soon veered away from protection of New York and other east coast
reservations." 72 Indeed, the United States embarked on the policy period known as
"removal," which entailed uprooting tribes and moving them primarily to the western
territories of Oklahoma and Kansas in order to open up more land for non-Indian
settlement. 73 Consistent with the removal policy, the Oneidas were encouraged to move
first to lands in Wisconsin, and then, through the Treaty of Buffalo Creek in 1838, to the
lands in Kansas. 74 As noted above, the Treaty of Buffalo Creek included a condition
that the Treaty's terms be fully and fairly explained to the Oneidas, and the Treaty
negotiator's explanation included assurances that the Oneidas could remain "where they
are forever,"75 if they chose not to relocate. 76
For the Oneidas, neither the promise of removal nor the promise to be allowed to
remain in New York was kept. By the mid-1840s New York had acquired most of the
remaining acres of Oneida reservation land, and by 1920 "only 32 acres continued to be

62. Treaty of FortSchuyler, supra n. 23.
63. See City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1495.
64. See id.
65. See David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson & Robert A. Williams, Jr., Cases and Materials on
FederalIndian Law 61-62 (5th ed., West 2004); Clinton, supra n. 1, at 131.
66. See Getches, Wilkinson & Williams, supran. 65, at 62, 84-86.
67. City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1484.
68. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 177).
69. Id.(quoting Treaty of Canandaigua,supra n. 24).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. City of Sherrill, 125 S.Ct. at 1485.
73. See id.; Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford M. Lytle, American Indians, American Justice 6-8 (U. Tex.
Press 1983); Getches, Wilkinson & Williams, supra n. 65, at 126-27 n. 2.
74. City of Sherrill, 125 S.Ct. at 1485 (citing Treaty of Buffalo Creek, supra n. 21).
75. Id. (quoting Jt. App. at 146, City of Sherrill, 125 S.Ct. 1478).
76. Id.
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held by the Oneidas." 77 At the same time, the United States abandoned the idea of
the Kansas lands to the public
removing the Oneidas to Kansas, and ultimately restored
78
settlement.
non-Indian
to
them
open
to
order
domain in
The City of Sherrill Court stated "[iut is well established that laches, a doctrine
focused on one side's inaction and the other's legitimate reliance, may bar long-dormant
claims for equitable relief."79 The Oneida Indian Nation's actions throughout the period
from 1795, when New York first attempted to circumvent the Non-Intercourse Act,
through the present, must therefore be examined in order to determine whether the Court
appropriately applied laches to their claim of tax immunity. As the City of Sherrill Court
noted, "[e]arly litigation concerning the Oneidas' land claims trained on monetary
recompense from the United States." 80 In 1893, during the hey-day of the allotment
period, the United States agreed to be sued for disposing of the Kansas lands to
non-Indian settlers, and the Oneidas "shared in the resulting award of damages. ' 81 It
would have been all but impossible for the Oneidas to get judicial relief for either New
York or the United States' actions up until this point. 82 First, claims against the United
States required their consent, due to sovereign immunity. Second, with regard to New
York, it was the consistent position of New York state courts that New York Indian
nations lacked capacity to sue, absent statutory authorization by the state. 83 Therefore,
up to that point, Oneidas' participation in the 1893 litigation is all they could have
reasonably done to seek legal redress.
The Oneida Indian Nation next initiated proceedings before the Indian Claims
Commission in 1951 to seek further compensation for the divestment of their reservation
lands. 84 Again, while the City of Sherrill Court described this as "a half century ' 85 after
the 1893 litigation, it would have been impractical, bordering on impossible, for the
Oneidas to litigate against any party other than the United States. In addition, the
Oneidas' ability to sue the federal government was dependent on the United States'

77. Id. at 1486.
78. Id.
79. City ofSherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1491. Interestingly, the only Indian law case cited by the Court in support
of its application of laches is Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317 (1892), an allotment-era decision denying the
remedy of establishing a constructive trust over lands conveyed by an Indian allottee to non-Indians in
violation of statutory restrictions. That case touched only on appropriate remedies for alleged violations of
individual property rights, not on the question of states' abilities to restrict tribal inherent powers. It was also
decided during a time when the Court regularly deferred to congressional policies of allotment that were bent
on dispossessing Indian tribes of their land. Today, the Court simultaneously ignores the doctrine of deferring
to congressional policy towards tribes while reviving the long-abandoned allotment and removal era policies.
See generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (1995) (documenting the tendency
throughout the modem era cases to revive allotment policies long repudiated by Congress).
80. City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1486.
81. Id.
82. See Richard B. Collins & Karla D. Miller, A People Without Law 32 (unpublished paper, copy on file
with author) (noting that throughout the nineteenth century "the American legal system was woefully
inadequate for Native Americans and tribes. Their abundant grievances against the federal government and
lawless settlers had no reasonable legal redress.").
83. Id. at 42-45.
84. City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1486.
85. Id.
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consent pursuant to the establishment of the Indian Claims Commission in 1946.86 In
short, the Oneidas, in joining in the 1893 litigation and suing the United States as early
as 1951, were doing all that could reasonably be expected of an Indian tribe to address
87
allegations of illegal dispossession of property.
As the City of Sherrill Court further conceded, the claims proceedings continued
until 1982, with the Oneidas receiving largely favorable rulings on their allegations that
the United States violated fiduciary duties to ensure the tribe received adequate
compensation from New York for its acquisitions during the period from 1795 through
1846.88 Importantly, the Court of Claims affirmed that the United States' quiet
acquiescence in New York's gobbling up of the Oneida reservation was an abdication of
the federal government's legal obligations under the Non-Intercourse Act. 89 This
acknowledgment should support the view that the Oneidas' reliance on the United States
to protect their interests throughout the period from 1795 through 1846 was reasonable,
and that they could not have been expected to fend off New York's attempts to dislodge
them from their treaty lands on their own. Yet, in City of Sherrill, the Court implied the
United States' abandonment of its guardian role should be used against the Indian
nations that it wronged. 90
In 1970, shortly after it became clear, as a matter of both legal and practical
realities, that Indian nations could maintain suits in federal court against state and local
governments, 9 1 the Oneidas "instituted a 'test case' against the New York Counties of
Oneida and Madison." 92 In the first round of this litigation, in Oneida Indian Nation of
New York v. County of Oneida ("Oneida F),9' the Supreme Court affirmed that the
Oneidas' claim was grounded in federal law, and upheld the federal court's subject
matter jurisdiction. 94 In the second round, in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation
of New York State ("OneidaIT'), 95 the Supreme Court rejected the counties' assertion of
equitable defenses, including laches, and ruled that New York had illegally acquired the
Oneidas' lands in violation of federal-tribal treaties, the Non-Intercourse Act, and federal
common law. 96 The Court in Oneida II did note that the lower courts had not considered

86. Claims cases were the only plausible avenue for tribes up until the late 1960s. See Collins & Miller,
supra n. 82, at 3 (observing that until the late 1960s, suits by Indian nations, other than claims cases, were rare
for a variety of reasons born of the history of suppression, poverty, and discrimination faced by tribes).
87. See Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession, & Sacred Obligations,38 Conn.
L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2006) (describing the myriad practical, legal, and political barriers to tribes initiating
litigation against state or local governments that persisted up until 1966).
88. City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1486.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1484 (noting that throughout the nineteenth century, the federal government did nothing to
interfere with New York's acquisitions of Oneida land); id. at 1492 n. 12 (emphasizing that "for generations"
the Oneidas sought relief for their mistreatment by the federal government, rather than seeking redress from
New York).
91. See Singer, supra n. 87, at _ ("It was not until 1966, when Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1362, that
federally-recognized Indian nations had the power to bring a lawsuit in federal court without first obtaining
consent of the United States.").
92. City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1486.
93. 414 U.S. 661 (1974) [hereinafter Oneida I].
94. City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1486-87.
95. 470 U.S. 226 (1985) [hereinafter Oneida 11].
96. City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1487.
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whether equitable doctrines should apply to the remedies sought by the Oneida Indian
Nation. 9 7 In subsequent litigation, the Oneida Indian Nation relied on the favorable
decisions in the Oneida II litigation to expand its land claims to include longer time
frames as well as more defendants, including private property owners.9 8 The district
court did apply equitable doctrines to these claims, and in 2000 refused to join the
private defendants on futility grounds. 99 Meanwhile, using a different tactic in the
over-all strategy of reacquiring some of the land within its reservation boundaries, the
Oneida Indian Nation began purchasing land in fee simple on the open marketacquiring the parcels that would become the subject of the tax litigation in 1997 and
1998. 100

It is important to emphasize two themes that emerge from this litigation history.
First, the Oneidas have been extraordinarily active in pursuing the wrongs against them,
first turning to the federal government and then, as soon as it was legally and practically
capable of doing so, to the counties for relief from what the Supreme Court found in
10 1
Oneida II to be clear violations of the Oneida Indian Nation's property rights.
Second, the lower courts appear to be applying equitable doctrines in a context-sensitive
manner, allowing the bulk of the Oneidas' legal claims against government entities to go
102
forward while limiting the relief available and excluding private landowners.
These two themes undermine the Court's reasoning with regard to the application
of laches. First, as the Court notes, "one side's inaction" 10 3 is a prerequisite to the
application of laches. I° 4 That element simply does not exist with regard to the Oneidas'
long-standing efforts to redress the United States' and the local and state governments'
illegal actions. The Oneida Indian Nation was as active as could be expected under the
coercive historical circumstances. The Court overlooks the history, seemingly willfully,
in concluding the Oneidas failed to take action in a timely manner. Second, the risk of
grave disruption to the settled expectations of property owners was non-existent with
regard to the Oneidas' claim in City of Sherrill, which was solely to assert immunity
from local property taxes for the parcels that it had purchased. No non-Indians would be
ousted from their lands. No enormous bill would have to be paid by Sherrill. Rather,
Sherrill would have to adjust to a slightly lower property tax base, something
municipalities are accustomed to in the contexts of property ownership by non-profits or
other governments. 105 The more disruptive land claims issues were not present in City

97. Oneida 11, 470 U.S. at 253 n. 27.
98. City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1487.
99. See Oneida Indian Nation ofN. Y v. County of Oneida, 199 F.R.D. 61, 79-85 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
100. City ofSherrill, 125 S.Ct. at 1488.
101. See Oneida 11, 470 U.S. 226.
102. See Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y, 199 F.R.D. at 93-95.
103. City of Sherrill, 125 S.Ct. at 1491.
104. Id; see also Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Damages-Equity-Restitution89 (2d ed., West 1993).
105. Even with regard to this fairness issue, the Court overlooks facts on the ground. The Oneida Indian
Nation maintains a grant program to compensate local governments for lost revenues. See Oneida Indian
Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, 145 F. Supp. 2d 226, 232 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); see also Jerde, supra n. 60,
at 356. The program is not a perfect substitute for reliable income flows from taxation, see id.at 356 n. 90, but
in the subjective mix of factors that can be considered when determining whether equitable relief is warranted,
the Court should have at least acknowledged it.
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of Sherrill, and moreover, were being handled in a manner the Court apparently
approved of in the lower courts. 106 Ironically, the Court's "parade
of horribles" 10 7 is
10 8
history.
litigation
the
contradicted by the Court's own recounting of
2.

The "Open Market Acquisition" Time Frame

The second way to evaluate whether the Oneida Indian Nation was dilatory in
asserting its tax immunity against Sherrill is to evaluate the time frame from when
Oneida purchased the parcels at issue in the case through when Oneida began objecting
to Sherrill's taxes. The Oneida Indian Nation acquired the parcels in 1997 and 1998.109
In 1997, Sherrill assessed property taxes against the parcels acquired in 1997.110
However, the Oneida Indian Nation "did not pay the assessed taxes, asserting that the
properties are contained within the Oneida Indian Reservation . . . and therefore are
nontaxable by state municipalities." 11 ' Therefore, the Oneida Indian Nation objected to
the city's taxation immediately. Litigation about the issue began not long after, in
2000.112

The Oneida Indian Nation could not possibly assert its immunity from taxation for
the parcels obtained in 1997 and 1998 at any time prior to the acquisition of those
parcels. Thus, it is painfully obvious that under this narrower time frame, laches should
not apply.
Even if a broader context to the Oneidas' land purchases is considered, it is
inappropriate to apply equitable doctrines implying sloth and undue passivity, as laches
and acquiescence do, 113 to their claim of tax immunity. Like all other American Indian
nations, the Oneidas were in no position to enter the property market until well into the
period in federal-tribal relations known as "the self-determination era.' 114 Charles
Wilkinson forcefully documents the poverty, despair, and powerlessness that dominated
115
Indian country, due to misguided and disastrous federal policies up until the 1960s.
Particularly for the New York tribes, whose land bases had been severely eroded, it
could hardly be expected that they could engage in market transactions to purchase
valuable property until they had restored, by other means, their political and economic
well-being.

106. See City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1489.
107. See id at 1493 (asserting that recognizing the Oneidas' tax immunity could ultimately result in adverse
consequences to private landowners).
108. See id at 1488-89.
109. Id. at 1488.
110. Oneida Indian Nation ofN. Y., 145 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
Ill. Id.at 232.
112. Id. at231.
113. See William M. Tabb & Elaine W. Shoben, Remedies in a Nutshell 49 (West 2005) (Laches is governed
by the maxim that '[e]quity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights."').
114. See Getches, Wilkinson & Williams, supran. 65, at 216-26 (describing self-determination policies).
115. See Charles Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations pt. 1 (W.W. Norton &
Co. 2005) (describing removal, allotment, and termination policies and their effects on tribes).
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The Court as Dependency-Forcing
The Supreme

Court, through a flawed historical analysis and consequent

inappropriate application of equitable doctrines, is substituting its own judgment about
the fate of tribes for that of the other branches of government. It has been clear, ever
since President Nixon articulated the current policy framework in 1970, that a major
federal goal is to continue to provide financial support to Indian nations, but
simultaneously to release them from the bureaucratic and paternalistic control of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs ("B.I.A.")." 6 In the period of self-determination, Congress has
passed numerous statutes encouraging tribal self-governance and independence, all of
117
which reflect that goal in various ways.
The Oneida Indian Nation, in re-purchasing its homelands in fee simple, is
perfectly enacting the federal aspiration of tribal sovereign existence without federal
micro-management. The Supreme Court, by contrast, is pushing the Oneida Indian
Nation and other tribes back into the dysfunctional state of dependence on the B.I.A. As
part of its rationale for applying equitable doctrines to the Oneidas' claim of sovereign
tax immunity, the Court suggests that the appropriate route for the Oneida Indian Nation
is to petition the Secretary of the Interior to take the Tribe's fee lands back into trust
status.118 Indeed, left with no other options, the Oneida Indian Nation is pursuing trust
status for its lands, and with luck will succeed in this second-best alternative to asserting
its sovereignty. 119 But is the Court wholly unaware of the Cobell v. Norton12 0 litigation
occurring just down the street in Washington, D.C., in which the B.I.A. has been roundly
chastised, albeit in a different trust status context, for its gross mismanagement of Indian
property?
The Court is prolonging the "dependent" state of Indian nations by forcing them to
seek shelter from the federal government-by necessitating taking land back into trust
status-during a time when at least some Indian nations finally have the resources to
begin to act as independent, albeit unique, sovereigns. The irony of this is sad indeed;
12 1
the Court, per Justice John Marshall, created the "'domestic dependent nation[]'.
status as a means of mediating colonialism. 122 Today, the Court forces the dependent
status to continue, despite the repudiation of colonialism and its moral underpinnings that
we allegedly embrace.

116. See Richard Nixon, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations
for Indian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (July 8, 1970).
117. See Getches, Wilkinson & Williams, supra n. 65, at 221-25 (listing some of the many congressional
statutes that promote tribal self-determination).
118. See City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1493-94.
119. See Adams, supra n. 5.
120. 377 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 2005).
121. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in FederalIndian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 397 (1993) (citing Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30
U.S. 1, 17 (1831)) (bracket in original, footnote omitted).
122. Seeid
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IV.

CONCLUSION

In City of Sherrill, the Court did little to change core doctrines of federal law
governing taxation of Indian nations. At the same time, the Court dramatically altered
the backdrop against which some tax immunity claims, and almost all land claims, will
be judged. Continuing in its vein of eviscerating Indian law by ignoring it, the Court
makes easy work for treatise drafters, but hard work for anyone trying to understand
what is actually going on. What is actually going on is that the Court, like courts during
the mid-twentieth century, must at some level think Indian nations are a thing of the past.
And with that unspoken assumption, the Court in City of Sherrill has taken the opposite
approach of Justice Marshall in his famous trilogy. Marshall struggled to mediate the
realpolitik of the times; Indian nations had been absorbed within the American legal
framework against their will, and there was little the Court could do but recognize their
status as "dependent" sovereigns, but sovereigns nonetheless.
Today, with no remorse and little comprehension, the Court is unilaterally forcing
a state of dependency on tribes at a time when they are finally emerging from that state
with the support, albeit uneven and often inadequate, of the other branches of the federal
government. Tribal success on the ground is thus in direct disproportion to tribal success
in the Highest Court. The best thing for Indian nations, and Indian law, is to stick
closely to the ground. With that strategy, with any luck there will still be cause to update
Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law in another twenty-some years. Otherwise,
there is the grim possibility that before too long, no updates will be necessary because no
federal Indian law, as such, will be left.
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